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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine different types of government spending while literature usually treats 
government spending as a homogenous compound. We disaggregate the government 
spending into three parts; namely, government investment, government wage component 
consumption (i.e. wage expenditure) expenditure, and non-wage component consumption 
(i.e. purchases of goods and services). Next, we estimate a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model that features a transmission mechanism with different types of 
government spending. In this regard, we manage to distinguish between different types of 
government spending where each type of spending has varied role in the economy. Such 
set up enables them produce different effects on macroeconomic variables.   
 
Keywords: Disaggregated government spending, Government investment, Government wage 
consumption, Government non-wage component consumption, DSGE model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The main contribution of this paper is that it features a transmission mechanism 
with different types of government spending: namely government investment, wage 
component government consumption and non-wage component government 
consumption. The mechanism works through government production which has a 
complementary relation with private consumption. Hence, government spending 
types that are used in the formation of government production have influence on 
households’ preferences and should not be considered as wasteful due to their 
additional easing effects on the economy.  
 
In the model, government production which plays a crucial role in attaining 
positive effects of private consumption is a function of government capital and 
government employment. Government capital is the accumulation of government 
investment and government employment is measured by government wage 
expenditure. These two types of spending are channeled into useful dispositions 
unlike government non-wage component consumption. Moreover, effects of 
government investment and government wage expenditure also differ from each 
other as government investment needs to be accumulated as government capital 
rather than used directly in the government production. Within this context, we 
claim that the composition of government spending is critical in the determination 
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of spending multipliers and different types of government spending have varied 
effects on economic variables.  
 
Nevertheless, government spending has been treated uniformly in most of the 
studies and as Leeper et al (2010) discusses, estimates of multipliers from these 
studies are all over the map, providing empirical support for virtually any policy 
conclusion.  For instance, in the current economic crisis, United States passed a 
$787 billion fiscal stimulus plan in February 2009 with the hope of boosting 
demand, limiting job losses and preventing deep recessions. Yet, there was a lack 
of consensus among economists indicating where each dollar should be spent in 
order to minimize the adverse effects of the crisis.  
 
In fact, the diversity of findings highlights the difficulties in obtaining reliable 
estimates of fiscal effects. This is mainly because responses of economic variables 
to government spending shocks depend on many factors; type of spending, how the 
spending is financed and how monetary policy acts in response. Thus, there is a 
need for systematic analysis that confronts all these fiscal policy complexities. In 
line with this, the objective of this paper is to shed light on the single effects of 
these factors in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; 
Section 3 describes the model and provides the first order conditions whereas its 
linearized counterparts are given in Section 4. Section 5 explains the calibration. 
Section 6 presents the results and finally Section 7 concludes. 
2.Literature Review 
Most of the recent theoretical literature on fiscal policy in DSGE models has been 
motivated by the empirical evidence. From an empirical point of view, 
identification of government spending shocks is problematic and has been the 
subject of a lively debate in recent years.1 However, theoretical models mainly 
attempt to capture the results of the VAR approach as this approach is considered 
as a means to account for the effects of government spending shocks in “normal” 
times, as opposed to extraordinary episodes like war or military build-up eras. 
Studies employing VAR approach typically find that a rise in total government 
spending (a positive spending shock) raises not only GDP, but also (private) 
consumption (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Gali et al 
(2007), Monacelli and Perotti (2008)). Regarding the response of private 
investment, it is found to be either insignificant as in Fatás and Mihov (2001) and 
Gali et al (2007) or negative (and significant) in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  
 
                                                 
1
 See Perotti (2007) and Ramey (2009) for a summary of the issues. 
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The theoretical literature, driven by DSGE models, begins with studies that employ 
a standard neoclassical framework such as Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992) and Baxter and King (1993).2 These studies suggest that an increase in 
government spending creates a negative wealth effect for the households as they 
anticipate an increase in taxes to finance the increase of government spending.3 
Households optimally respond to this by decreasing their consumption and 
increasing their labor supply. The increased labor supply lowers the real wage but 
raises output. In the new steady-state, working hours are higher and consumption is 
lower which contradicts the empirical findings.4  
 
Following Neoclassical models, New Keynesian models featuring a sticky price 
and monopolistically competitive environment were commonly used. The idea of 
introducing imperfect competition and sticky prices embedded in the New 
Keynesian models was promising for at least two reasons. First, imperfect 
competition generates an aggregate demand externality according to which an 
increase in output leads to a rise in profits and income. Higher profits and income 
in turn may help to offset the negative wealth effect. Secondly, sticky prices raise 
the possibility that labor demand reacts stronger than labor supply, with real wages 
increasing alongside labor supply5. Hence, in New Keynesian models, the wealth 
                                                 
2
 Infinitely-lived forward-looking agents, flexible prices, complete asset markets, and lump-sum taxation. 
3Assuming they are financed by non-distortionary taxes. 
4
 Response of investment depends on the persistence. If the shock is sufficiently persistent, the rise in the 
marginal product of capital leads to more investment and capital accumulation. 
5
 To meet increasing demand stemming from increasing government expenditure, some firms will increase 
production as only a fraction of them can adjust their prices. 
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effect is accompanied by a demand effect due to price stickiness, whereby both 
effects increase output. Yet, the wealth effect has a negative impact on 
consumption while the demand effect has a positive impact. Accordingly, the net 
response of consumption depends on the relative strength of the two effects where 
wealth effect still dominates under plausible parameters. 
 
As the standard New Keynesian model cannot replicate the response of increasing 
consumption under plausible parameters, it has been modified in order to attain 
increasing consumption. This was achieved by limiting the ability of the private 
sector to smooth consumption via asset markets, as in the model by Gali et al 
(2007). These authors have extended the standard New-Keynesian sticky-price 
model by allowing for the co-existence of “non-Ricardian” and “Ricardian” 
households, with the former simply consuming their after-tax disposable income 
each period and the latter optimizing in a forward-looking manner and thereby 
smoothing consumption over time. Accordingly, Ricardian agents are more 
sophisticated in the model because they can hold bonds and receive profits deriving 
from firms’ ownership. On the other hand, non-Ricardian households, also referred 
to as rule of thumb households, only consume their current disposable income each 
period and do not have the ability to borrow or save. As a result, they cannot 
smooth their consumption path in the face of fluctuations. Since this is a simple 
means of breaking Ricardian equivalence, presence of rule of thumb households 
contributes to the New Keynesian models in producing positive co-movement 
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between government spending and consumption. Nevertheless, this analysis has 
been criticized as relying on a large percentage of rule of thumb households. For 
example, Coenen and Straub (2005) conclude that the estimated share of the non-
Ricardian households in the euro area is not sufficiently large to deliver a positive 
response of consumption. Similarly, Iwata (2009) showed that the estimated mean 
value of non-Ricardian share is one fourth for Japan, which is half of what Gali et 
al (2007) are relying upon. 
An alternative modification to the standard New Keynesian models is to allow 
consumer preferences to depend on government spending. Under such a 
modification, government spending gains an additional role in the economy. First 
studies assume that government expenditures and private consumption directly 
enter the utility function of the representative agent linearly such as Barro (1981), 
Aschauer (1985), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Finn (1998). Some of the 
recent studies exploit government spending through the concept of effective 
consumption, which is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of 
private consumption and government spending. Linnemann and Schabert (2006) 
and Bouakez and Rebei (2007) are examples of this kind. This work has similar a 
set up to these studies in the sense that household preferences depend on 
government spending in association with private consumption. However, such a 
structure is not applicable directly to all types of government spending.6 Instead, it 
                                                 
6
 Even we include all types of government spending to the effective consumption, results do not 
change. 
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works indirectly through government production. In other words, we believe 
placing total government spending in the effective consumption is misleading as 
government spending itself may have no direct effect in this regard unless this 
spending is made use of in way that is beneficial for the public. For instance 
government can recruit workers and purchase all the machinery necessary for road 
construction. However, such employment and material purchase can contribute to a 
household’s car consumption only if all these spending are put together in 
producing a highway, which is complementary to car consumption.  
Hence, our model differs from other studies in two dimensions. First, government 
spending is disaggregated into three parts: government investment, government 
wage component consumption (government wage bill) and government non-wage 
component consumption (government purchases of intermediate goods and 
services).  
Second, government has a productive role in the economy even though this 
production differs from the production of private sector in some aspects. In the next 
subsections, the objectives (together with the constraints) of the agents are 
presented and transmission mechanism of shocks is explained. 
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3 The Model 
This section describes a dynamic general equilibrium model that consists of a 
representative household, a continuum of firms (indexed by j) producing 
differentiated intermediate goods, a perfectly competitive firm producing a final 
good, a central bank in charge of monetary policy, and government as a fiscal 
authority. All of the agents are infinitely lived and time is divided into periods and 
each period is indexed by the subscript t. The baseline model such as nominal 
rigidities in the form of price stickiness and real rigidities in the form of investment 
adjustment cost are standard to the literature. This framework serves as a starting 
point since it has been shown to fit the US data.  
 
3.1 Households 
The economy is populated by a single, infinitely lived, representative household. 
Households derive utility from leisure (1−N) and effective consumption ( tC
~ ). In 
this representation, Nt, is the sum of hours worked for government (public 
employment; NG) and hours worked for private sector (private employment; NP): 
t
P
t
G
t NNN += . Likewise, effective consumption is defined as a CES index of 
private consumption (C) and government production (YG) similar to Bouakez and 
Rebei (2007):7 
                                                 
7
 The CES specification captures the idea of diminishing marginal returns to public spending in order to 
achieve a given level of effective consumption, ceteris paribus. 
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In the above representation, a is the weight of private consumption in the effective 
consumption index and fν  0 is the elasticity of substitution between private 
consumption and government production. As ∞→ν , private consumption and 
government production become perfect substitutes. This is the case when 
government competes with private sector by producing rival goods. Providing free 
lunches is an example of government producing rival goods. In contrast, Ct and YGt 
become perfect complements when 0=ν  and government produces non-rival 
public goods.  In this case, government production increases the marginal utility of 
consumption, providing an additional motive for households to work more. This, in 
turn, mitigates the negative wealth effect. Education services, knowledge generated 
by R&D, legislative services are examples of government production. A critical 
question at this point is whether private consumption and public spending are 
complements or substitutes. This has been examined by several studies such as 
those by Aschauer (1985), Karras (1994), Ni (1995), Amano and Wirjanto (1998), 
and Okubo (2003). The empirical results, however, are mixed and inconclusive. 
In the model, households have preferences described by the following utility 
function: 
∑
∞
=0
0 ),
~(
t
tt
t NCUE β
 
where  
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In the above representation; )1,0(∈β  is the discount factor, Et is the time t 
conditional expectation operator and tPtGt NNN +=  as previously defined.  
The budget constraint faced by the household is as below:  
ttttt
k
tt
P
t
P
tt
G
t
G
t
t
t
ttt TPBKRPNWPNWPR
B
ICP −+++=++ +1)(    
In this representation, Pt is the price level, WPt is the private sector real wage, and 
WGt is the public sector real wage. As indicated by the budget constraint, 
households receive labor income of PtWtPNtP from private sector and PtWtGNtG from 
public sector as compensation to working.  
Capital accumulation (Kt) evolves according to the law of motion (as in Christiano 
et al. 2005); 
ttttt IIKK φδ −+−=+ )1(1  where 2
1
]1[
2
−=
−t
t
t I
Iξφ and function tφ  satisfies 
φ = 'φ =0 and ''φ >0 in steady-state. With such specification, adjustment costs are 
proportional to the rate of change in investment and it is costly to change the flow 
of investment.  Thus, investment is inertial; it is unresponsive in the short run, but 
starts to build up its response gradually over time. 
Following Cordoba, Perez and Torres (2009), an important assumption is that there 
is a positive wage premium received by public sector employees relative to private 
sector employees. This is the case for countries having a small share of public 
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employment in the labor market. The existence of such a positive premium is a 
well-documented empirical fact of developed economies, as shown in the surveys 
of Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986), Bender (1998), and Gregory and Borland 
(1999). While there is little research on the determinants of the public wage 
premium, the literature on public sector labor markets reveals that the influence of 
public sector labor unions and the ”vote producing” activities by civil servants are 
the potential reasons for the existence of the earnings differential. In the US, for 
instance, the most prominent unions are among public sector employees such as 
teachers and police.  
In conjunction with this assumption, the public wage in the model is deemed as the 
upper limit of the private wage. Such a setup is consistent with the varying public 
wage premium shown in Figure 1. This figure illustrates how the private and public 
sector are associated in the labor market by exploiting OECD Economic Outlook 
Database. The upper panel of the figure shows how this premium has changed over 
time in the US and in Euro Area. The ratio of public wages over private wages has 
fluctuated between 1 and 1.2 in the US whereas this ratio has risen as high as 1.4 in 
Euro Area. Lower panel of the same figure displays the ratio of public employees 
over private employees during the same period. Accordingly, the public/private 
wage premium has had a somewhat parallel reflection in the evolution of the ratio 
of government sector employees to private sector employees. For instance, the ratio 
of public to private employees in the Euro Area reached a maximum in the second 
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half of the 1980s. This corresponds to the period in which the wage premium 
reached its minimum. 
According to the budget constraint presented above, households receive income 
from renting their capital holdings (Kt) to intermediate firms and purchasing 
nominally riskless one-period bonds (Bt). The (real) rental cost of capital is Rkt and 
the gross nominal return on bonds is Rt. Lastly, It and Dt respectively denote 
investment expenditures and dividends from ownership of firms while Tt is lump-
sum taxes (or transfers, if negative) paid by these consumers. 
The first order conditions (with respect to Ct, NtP, Kt+1, Bt+1 and It) for the 
household maximization problem are given below. Note that the household 
maximizes only with respect to private labor as government employment is 
exogenously given to the households and the representative household initially 
meets the government labor demand as she earns a higher wage for working the 
government (This is due to the positive public wage premium). After meeting 
government labor demand which is a small portion of her total employment, she 
optimally chooses her labor supply for private sector.   
tvtvt aCC λσ =
−
+−
11
~
                    (1) 
t
P
tt WN λψ =                    (2) [ ] ttttktt QQR λδλλβ =−+ ++++ )1(1111                 (3) 
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In these equations, Qt represents the shadow price of additional unit of capital and 
is equal to one at its steady state. Similarly, tλ  represents the Lagrange multiplier of 
the budget constraint.  Again note that the above expressions imply that the 
households choose the supply of private labor, given that public labor is determined 
inelastically by the government.  
 
3.2 Firms 
I assume that a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms produce 
differentiated intermediate goods that are used as inputs by a (perfectly 
competitive) firm producing a single final good.  
Final Goods Firm 
The final good is produced by a representative, perfectly competitive firm with a 
constant returns technology: ∫ −
−
=
1
0
1
1
))(( ε
ε
ε
ε
djjXY ttP   where Xt(j) is the quantity of 
intermediate good used as an input and ε>1. Profit maximization, taking as given 
the final goods price Pt and the prices for the intermediate goods Pt(j), all j ∈ [0, 1], 
yields the set of demand schedules: 
t
P
t
t
t YP
jPjX ε−= ))(()( . Hence, the zero profit condition: ∫ −−=
1
0
1
1
1 ))(( εε djjPP tt  
 
 
 
  
17
Intermediate Goods Firm 
The production function for an intermediate goods firm is given by: 
)1( 11 )()()( αα −= jNjKjY PtttP  where Kt(j) and Nt(j) represent the capital and labor 
services hired by firm.  
Cost minimization, taking the wage and the rental cost of capital as given, implies 
the optimality condition: )(
)()1(
1
1
jN
jK
R
W
t
P
t
t
k
t
P
α
α−
=     (6) 
Real marginal cost is common to all firms:   
1
1
1
1
)(
)()1( 1
1
1
1
α
α
α
α
α
α
−
−−
−
= k
t
P
t
t R
WMC        (7) 
 
Price Setting  
Intermediate firms are assumed to set nominal prices in a staggered fashion, 
according to the rule proposed by Calvo (1983). Each firm resets its price with 
probability 1-θ of each period, independent of the time elapsed since the last 
adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 1-θ of producers reset their prices, while a 
fraction θ keep their prices unchanged. A firm resetting its price in period t will 
seek to solve:  
Max(P*)  ]})/*)[(({
0
ktkttkt
Pk
kt
t
k
t
k MCPPjY
C
C
E +++
+
∞
=
−∑ βθ
  
subject to the sequence of demand constraints:  
kt
P
kttktkt
P YPPjXjY +−+++ == ε)/*()()(  
 
First order conditions can be obtained from the maximization as; 
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where µ ≡ ε / (ε−1) is the gross “frictionless” price markup at zero inflation steady 
state. Hence, at steady state: MC≡1 / µ ≡ (ε-1) / ε     
Finally, the equation describing the dynamics for the aggregate price level is given 
by: 
[ ] εεε θθ −−−
−
−+= 1
1
11
1 *))(1( ttt PPP       (9) 
 
3.3. Monetary Policy 
The stance of monetary authority is important in determining the movements of the 
real interest rate, which plays a role in how macroeconomic variables react to 
spending shocks. For instance, recent work by Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland 
(2009) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) have pointed out that when 
the monetary policy is completely unresponsive or the nominal interest is at the 
zero bound, the monetary-fiscal interactions have significant effects on the size of 
fiscal multipliers.  
On the other hand, we consider the case of active monetary policy where the central 
bank is assumed to set the nominal interest rate rt ≡ Rt −1 every period according to 
a standard Taylor type rule:  
ttytt yrr εϕpiϕ +++= ∏ ˆ        (10) 
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where r is the steady state nominal interest rate and both parameters are positive. In 
this equation, and henceforth, lower-case letters with hats denote log-deviations 
with respect to the corresponding steady state values.  Thus, this rule implies that 
the nominal interest rate should respond to divergences of actual inflation rates 
from target inflation rates and of actual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 
potential GDP.  Such representation is sufficient to reflect the variations in the 
Federal Funds rate over the Greenspan era which corresponds to the second half of 
our sample period.  
 
3.4. Fiscal Policy 
The government’s budget is constraint is defined as below: 
ttttttt
t
t
tt GNWPGWPGIPBR
B
TP )()()(1 +++=+ +
 
where (GI), (GW) and (GNW) respectively represent government investment, 
government wage consumption and government non-wage consumption. 
According to the budget equation, government can finance its spending either by 
borrowing (debt, Bt) or taxing households (Tt).  
Regarding the government’s fiscal rule, unlike monetary policy, there isn’t any 
widely accepted specification. Leeper (1991) initially mentions a fiscal rule with 
taxes responding to the level of real outstanding government debt. Then, McGrattan 
(1994) introduces reduced form fiscal rules with a VAR representation of 
exogenous state variables, government spending and tax rates and Schmitt-Grohe 
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and Uribe (2007) show that such rules can approximate optimal policy rules. 
Following these studies, we assume below fiscal rule for the government: 
tgtbt gbt ˆˆˆ ϕϕ +=         (12) 
where parameters are again positive constants.8 
On the spending side, all types of government spending (in deviations from steady 
state, and normalized by steady state values) are assumed to evolve exogenously 
according to some autoregressive process of AR(1):  
ttgwt ewgwg += −1)ˆ()ˆ( ρ
        
ttgnwt ewgnwgn += −1)ˆ()ˆ( ρ
          
ttgit eigig += −1)ˆ()ˆ( ρ
  
where 0 < ρ < 1, and et represents an i.i.d. government spending shock with 
constant variance.  
For government wage expenditure, which is the multiplication of government 
employment and public wage, the shock stems from the government employment 
according to the model. This is because we have already assumed public wage is 
constant and defined as the maximum amount that private wage can reach.  
In addition to its standard tasks, we assign a production role to the government. 
Thus, the government is assumed not only to spend and collect lump-sum taxes (Tt) 
from households but also to produce. From this aspect, this study is similar to 
Cavallo (2005) in which government produces output by using a fraction of its 
purchases of goods in combination with the labor hired from households. On the 
                                                 
8
 As parameters of fiscal rule ),( gb ϕϕ  can differ from each other, we keep debt (Bt) in the budget equation 
even though taxes are lump-sum. 
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other hand, unlike Cavallo (2005), an important feature of government production 
in this study is that government production is not sold in the market; hence it is not 
a component of total output.  
The government produces government output, YG, from government capital, (GK), 
and public employment, (NG), according to the following production function:  
11 1)()( γγ −= tGttG NGKY       (11) 
According to (11), we assume that the government combines hours and its capital 
to assemble what we refer to as government output. This is consistent with the 
NIPA tables as shown in Table 2.1. According to this table, added value of 
government corresponds to the sum of compensation of government employees and 
government consumption of fixed capital. BEA categorizes both items as 
government consumption expenditures. For purposes of the model, however, we 
classify government consumption of fixed capital in the context of government 
investment, as it is merely a measure of the services of general government fixed 
assets and represents depreciation of capital goods.  
As before government’s capital accumulation of government evolves as below; 
ttttt GIGIGKGK φδ )()())(1()( 1 −+−=+  where 2
1
]1[
2
−=
−t
t
t I
Iξφ    
As described in Section 3.1, government production has a role in the formation of 
effective consumption together with private consumption. Hence, depending on the 
data, government production might possess either complementary or substitute 
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characteristics to private consumption. For instance, while government spending 
used for building a highway is complementary to car consumption, it becomes a 
substitute if the government gives the same car itself as subvention. 
 
3.5. Market Clearing: 
The clearing of factor and good markets requires that the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
∫=
1
0
)( djjKK tt          
)( jXYY ttPt ==    
tttt GNWGWGIG )()()( ++=
 
tttt GICY ++=  
t
G
tt
G
t
P
t NdjjNNNN +=+= ∫
1
0
)(   
 
4. Linearized Equilibrium Conditions 
In the present section, we derive log-linear versions of the key optimality and 
market-clearing conditions that will be used in the analysis of the model’s 
equilibrium dynamics. Some of these conditions hold exactly, whereas others 
represent first order approximations around a zero-inflation steady state. As a 
reminder, lower-case letters with hats denote log-deviations with respect to the 
corresponding steady state values. 
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4.1. Households 
Next we list the log-linearized versions of the defined households’ optimality 
conditions, expressed in terms of the aggregate variables. Log linearizations of the 
first order equations from (1) to (5) are respectively presented below:  
ttt cc
v
ˆ
ˆ
1)~ˆ)(1(ˆ
ν
σλ −+−=         (13) 
tt
p
t nw ˆˆ
ˆ ψλ =+           (14) 
ttttt
k
t
k qqrR ˆˆ)ˆˆ)(1()ˆ( 1111 +=+−++ ++++ λλδβλβ     (15) 
11
ˆˆ
++ +=+ tttt r piλλ         (16) 
0)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ 11 =−+−+ +− ttttt iiiiq βξξ        (17) 
 
Lastly, the log-linearized capital accumulation equations are as follows:  
ttt ikk ˆˆ)1(ˆ 1 δδ +−=+  and  
ttt igkgkg )ˆ()ˆ)(1()ˆ( 1 δδ +−=+   
Also, note that private wage can be obtained from (13) and (14) as: 




−+−−= tttt
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v
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1)~ˆ)(1(ˆˆ
ν
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4.2. Firms 
Starting with the firms’ production function (which is also equal to total production 
in the economy as government production is not sold), the log-linearized of it is 
presented below:   
t
p
tt
p nky ˆ)1(ˆˆ 11 αα −+=        (18) 
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Moreover, log-linearization of (8) and (9) around the zero inflation steady state 
yields the familiar equation describing the dynamics of inflation as a function of the 
log deviations of the real marginal cost from its steady-state level:   
ttt cm )ˆ(1 ζβpipi += +     where θ
βθθζ )1)(1( −−=       (19) 
Ignoring constant terms; tt
p
t
p
t
p cmnyw )ˆ(ˆˆˆ +−=  and tttptk cmkyr )ˆ(ˆˆ +−= .  
Equivalently, defining the average mark up in the economy as tt cm )ˆ(ˆ −=µ , 
equations given above can be written as a function of average mark up. 
 
4.3 Fiscal Policy 
Linearization of the government production function is given by: 
t
g
tt
g nkgy ˆ)1()ˆ(ˆ 11 γγ −+=        (20) 
And ttt igkgkg )ˆ()ˆ)(1()ˆ( 1 δδ +−=+  
Furthermore, linearization of the government budget constraint around a steady 
state with zero debt and a balanced primary budget yields 
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R
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4.4. Market Clearing 
t
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5. Calibration  
 
In the present section we analyze the effects of shocks to each government 
spending type in the model economy described above. To do so, we calibrate our 
parameters in line with the literature. This includes setting the subjective discount 
factor β to 0.99 (so that the annual steady state real return on financial assets is 
4%), the depreciation rate δ to 0.025 (implying a 10% annual depreciation rate of 
capital), the production function parameters of firms (α1) to 0.33 and of government 
( 1γ ) to 0.85 (which makes the steady state labor share in income approximately 
equal to 67% and 15% respectively). We take weight of disutility from working 
(κ ) in the utility function as 1. These values are roughly consistent with the data as 
discussed by Gali et al (2007). Furthermore, the capital adjustment cost parameter 
of ξ is assigned a value equal to 3 as estimated by Christiano et al. (2005) and 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2008).  
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Regarding the ratios employed in the paper, US data is examined. Some of the 
steady state variables are also calibrated based on averages over the sample period 
considered in the paper. In this perspective, steady-state ratios of debt to GDP and 
total government spending to GDP are set as 0.33 and 20 percent respectively. 
Shares of government wage expenditure, non-wage consumption and government 
investment are calibrated as 50, 25 and 25 percent of total government spending 
respectively reflecting their average shares for the US over the sample. The share of 
government working hours in total working hours is set as 1/6. Figure 2 and 3 
illustrate the data associated with the stated ratios. Additionally, a steady state price 
markup (µ-1) of 0.2 is chosen by setting ε equal to 6. The fraction of firms that 
keep their prices unchanged (θ) is given a baseline value of 0.75 implying to 
average price duration of one year. 
Parameters obtained from the US data are shown below in line with Gali et al 
(2011) and Bouakez and Rebei (2007): 
 Description Value
s 
ψ  Elasticity of wages with respect to hours 0.20 
σ  Inverse of elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution 
1.00 
a
 Weight of private consumption 0.80 
ρ
 Autoregressive parameter of government 
spending shocks 
0.90 
yγ  Response of nominal interest rate to output 0.50 
piγ  Response of nominal interest rate to inflation 
1.50 
bφ  Response of tax to debt 0.33 
gφ  Response of tax to government spending 0.10 
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For the elasticity of substitution parameter between C and YG (ν ), we use several 
values given that this is a crucial parameter representing the degree of substitution 
between government production and (private) consumption in our model. Yet, our 
inferences are based on the results obtained from employing this parameter as 0.25 
or 0.5. This is mainly because Bouakez and Rebei (2007) attain this parameter as 
0.33 in their work in a similar set up.  
 
6 Results 
6.1 Responses of the Model 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 display the response functions of output, (private) consumption 
and (private) investment given one percentage point shock to each type of 
government spending. The x-axis shows quarters after the shock hits the economy 
and the y-axis shows deviations from the steady state in response to a unit shock in 
government spending.  
 
Figure 6 shows the output responses to an increase in each type of government 
spending. Output rises on impact in all graphs which is a common finding in the 
empirical literature. Apart from this, these graphs indicate that size of output 
responses differ among the spending types. Regarding (private) consumption, it 
increases in response to a shock in government wage expenditure but decreases in 
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response to a government non-wage consumption shock. Lastly, responses of 
(private) consumption are initially negative in the case of government investment 
shocks, but become positive over time while government investment accumulates 
as government capital. 
Regarding the positive effects of government spending shocks on output and 
consumption, government production (which is a function of government wage 
consumption and government capital) plays a role in offsetting the negative wealth 
effect in addition to price stickiness and imperfect competition. Typically, given a 
government spending shock, households foresee to be taxed later. In order to 
compensate this negative effect, they optimally choose to increase their labor 
supply which in turn lowers their real wage. As a result, output rises with 
increasing labor but consumption shrinks due to the negative wealth effect. 
However, adding government production into the mechanism mitigates the 
negative wealth effect as government production serves as a complement to private 
consumption in the formation of effective consumption. Hence, a government wage 
consumption shock (and a government investment shock after a certain period of 
time) increases the marginal utility of consumption providing an additional motive 
for households to consume (as shown in Figure 5).  
Lastly, the responses of (private) investment, all types of spending shocks have 
negative effects (shown in Figure 4). This result is in line with Blanchard and 
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Perotti (2002) which obtain negative responses of (private) investment given a 
spending shock. 
 
6.2 Impact Multipliers 
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), studies generally summarize the effects of 
government spending by the impact multiplier, which is the increase in the level of 
output k periods ahead in response to a change in the fiscal variable of interest 
given by ∆Gt at time t.9 
Impact multiplier k periods ahead = 
t
kt
G
Y
∆
∆ +
 
 
Figure 7 shows how output multipliers vary over time with respect to the parameter 
representing the degree of substitution between government production and 
(private) consumption. For our benchmark cases (for which ν  is 0.25 or 0.5 
implying that government production and private consumption are complements), 
government wage expenditure shock has the largest output multipliers indicating 
that a fiscal stimulus plan should primarily include government wage expenditure. 
On the other hand, government wage expenditure shock produces the smallest 
multipliers if the government output of a particular country acts as a substitute with 
private consumption.   
                                                 
9
 For instance the government spending multiplier is computed as follows, 
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, where Y 
and G are the steady state values of output and government spending respectively. 
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Output multipliers of government investment and government non-wage 
consumption are mostly parallel to each other. Yet, smaller the degree of 
substitution between government production and (private) consumption, the bigger 
the multiplier of government investment becomes on average. 
 
7 Conclusion  
In the paper, total government spending has been disaggregated in the context of a 
theoretical model which assigns different roles to each type of government 
spending. The model incorporates a transmission mechanism regarding the effects 
of various types of government spending on economic variables. The government 
wage component of consumption has the largest effect on economic variables 
affecting the economy through the public sector employees necessary for 
government production. Government investment has a similar transmission 
mechanism but its effects are limited as it needs to accumulate as government 
capital. Additionally, all types of spending shocks influence the output directly as 
they are components of the total government spending.  
 
Figures 4-6 demonstrate the contemporaneous responses in output, private 
consumption and private investment to each type of government spending shocks. 
Accordingly a government wage expenditure shock has positive effects both on 
private consumption and output. As this spending type constitutes half of the total 
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spending, total government spending usually reflects the responses to government 
wage expenditure shocks. Other two government spending types have also positive 
effects on output whereas their responses on (private) consumption and (private) 
investment are mostly negative. Yet, negative effect of government investment 
shock on (private) consumption turns to positive over time as the government 
capital reaches a certain level. 
 
Consequently, these results provide an explanation for the wide range of multipliers 
existing in the literature. An equal amount of total government spending might 
have different multipliers depending on its composition as different types of 
government spending have different effects on output and private consumption. 
With this set up, we bring an alternative explanation to the empirical puzzle of 
increasing consumption given a government spending shock in addition to Gali et 
al (2007). These authors decompose the standard representative household into two 
types by introducing rule of thumb household and emphasizing their consumption 
behavior difference. We also feature a disaggregating approach but in total 
government spending (rather than the representative household) and assign 
different roles to each type. 
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Figure 1 Public/Private Sector Interaction 
 
Ratio of Public/Private Sector Wages Per Employee 
         
 
Ratio of Public/Private Sector Employee 
 
Source: Labor force surveys (OECD). 
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Figure 2 Share of Total Government Spending in GDP (%) 
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Figure  3 Ratio of Net Federal Debt to Output  
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Figure 4 Model Responses of (Private) Investment 
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Figure 5 Model Responses of (Private) Consumption 
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Figure 6 Model Responses of Output 
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Figure 7 Output Multipliers 
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